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Foreword from the 
Health Foundation
Th e knowledge that poor systems can cause harm is not 
new, but the size of this problem has not been established 
systematically. Th is report provides groundbreaking 
evidence of the extent to which important clinical systems 
and processes fail, and the potential these failings have 
to harm patients. 
Th is study forms part of the Health Foundation’s work 
to help healthcare organisations improve the quality 
of services they off er. Our Safer Patients Initiative has 
highlighted the need to take a clinical systems approach 
to improving safety, since it is failings in these systems 
that oft en contribute to breakdowns in patient safety. 
Th e work also supports our Safer Clinical Systems 
programme by providing a much-needed evidence base. 
It systematically identifi es and documents the diff erent 
defects in specifi c points of the care pathway, the extent 
to which they vary and their potential for patient harm.
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Th e results of this study identify the variation across health
care in the reliability of fi ve key systems and processes: 
– availability of information when making clinical decisions
– prescribing
– handover 
– availability of equipment in operating theatres
– availability of equipment for inserting intravenous lines.
We cannot continue to treat the levels of risk identifi ed in this 
report as acceptable or inevitable. More research is required
to investigate the underlying factors aff ecting the reliability of 
healthcare systems and processes, and the impact on patient 
safety. However, translating this into practice is not simple. 
Th e Health Foundation is taking this work forward with our 
Safer Clinical Systems programme to improve the safety and 
reliability of healthcare. We would encourage NHS leaders and 
practitioners to use these fi ndings to consider how to improve 
reliability in their own organisations. 
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Reliability in healthcare
Good healthcare is consistently good health care. Consistency ensures 
that people delivering and receiving healthcare can trust that the 
prescription is right, the diff erent people involved have all the 
necessary information, the right equipment is available and that 
all the other factors involved in their care are operating correctly.
Th e concept of ‘reliability’ in health care has been drawn from other 
industries – such as the nuclear power and aviation industries – 
where safety is also paramount. It focuses specifi cally on the stages 
where people can make mistakes and sets up systems that should 
ensure that those mistakes do not happen. If one part does go wrong, 
the next part of the process should still operate in the right way, so 
that the potential for damage is minimised.
Th is is not simply a matter of putting in place proper guidelines 
and expecting practitioners to follow them. It involves identifying 
– in advance – the points at which those mistakes can happen, the 
diff erent elements that contribute to those mistakes, and the systems 
that practitioners should follow in order to ensure patient safety.
Key fi ndings
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Key fi ndings
Th is study was commissioned by the Health 
Foundation to examine the extent, type and 
causes of failures in reliability in diff erent 
healthcare systems: failures which have the 
potential to create risk or cause patient harm. 
Th e research shows that:
Failures in reliability pose 
a real risk to patient safety
A signifi cant proportion of the reliability 
failures were associated with risks to patient 
safety. For example, we found 15% of outpatient 
appointments were aff ected by missing clinical 
information at our study sites. In 20% of these 
cases patients were exposed to risk (as judged 
by the doctors involved).
 Important clinical systems 
and processes are unreliable 
Fully reliable systems would function correctly 
under expected conditions. Th e four clinical 
systems for which reliability could be measured 
had an average failure rate of 13%–19%.
Th ere are wide variations 
in reliability 
Diff erent organisations varied signifi cantly in
their reliability: problems such as faulty or 
missing equipment aff ected 37% of operations 
at organisation D but only 12% at organisation F.
Unreliability is the result 
of common factors 
Across the fi ve systems and organisations, 
unreliability was usually the result of the 
same factors. Th ese included: a lack of feedback 
mechanisms for both individuals and systems; 
poor communication; and a widespread 
acceptance on the part of clinical staff  that 
systems are going to be unreliable, and that 
this is not their responsibility.
 It is possible to create highly 
reliable systems 
Th e variation between and within organisations 
suggests that it is possible to create systems that 
are more reliable.
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Ideas for improvement
Our fi ndings suggest that 
improvement may be achieved 
in many areas including:
1. Improving feedback
mechanisms
Many systems do not have eff ective feedback 
mechanisms. Th is was highlighted as an 
issue for both individuals and supply chains. 
For example, better feedback to doctors 
about their prescribing errors may help 
improve prescribing.
2. Standardisation
Standard formats for undertaking procedures 
are likely to improve the safety of care. Clinical 
freedom can still exist within standardisation 
but it is suggested that some of the present 
systems allow too much freedom, and therefore 
reduce reliability. For example, a standard 
format for handover is likely to ensure that all 
essential items are handed over.
3. Improving communication
In several areas a failure in communication 
meant that errors were not identifi ed at an 
early stage or systems were not corrected. 
For example, better communication between 
theatre staff  and sterilisation units would help 
the units understand what staff  need.
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noitasinagrO  cipoT 
G F E D C B A  
  Information at the point of  ✓    ✓  ✓clinical decision making
  Prescribing for hospital inpatients ✓ ✓ ✓ 
    
  Handover within acute medicine   ✓ ✓  ✓  
     
 Operating theatre equipment  ✓   ✓  ✓ 
  Equipment for inserting  ✓   ✓  ✓intravenous lines 
HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS?  09
4. Developing a culture 
of challenge
Many interviews revealed a culture in 
which poor reliability and the potential for 
errors passed without comment or challenge. 
Healthcare professionals and other members 
  may need to be encouraged to challenge 
poor reliability, and equally need to see that 
their suggestions are met positively and result 
in change. 
5. Encouraging a sense 
of ownership
Individuals tend to blame others or the 
systems rather than seeing themselves as 
people who can help to improve reliability.
Adverse event – an unintended injury caused by 
medical management rather than the disease process.
Reliability – the probability that a system will function 
correctly and, as a result, the chance that evidence based 
care will be provided. 
Failure rate – the inverse of reliability – so a 15% failure
rate represents 85% reliability.
Standardisation – establishing a process which always 
functions in the same way, with no variation.
 Study sites and topics
 is research had NHS ethics approval. Seven NHS organisations were studied and we collected data from three 
 erent organisations for each topic.
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Introduction
Th e extent to which healthcare can endanger
patient safety is now acknowledged worldwide.1 
In the UK, a case note review published in 2001 
confi rmed that 11.7% of admissions in two 
hospitals led to an adverse event, which is 
similar to the adverse event rates previously 
reported in Australia and the US.2
Th e need to address patient safety by tackling 
healthcare systems was made abundantly clear 
in 2001, with the report of an inquiry into 
the death of a young man, Wayne Jowett. 
He died because a chemotherapy drug was 
mistakenly injected into his spine rather than 
a vein.3 Th e inquiry found over 40 errors in the 
chain of events leading up to the fi nal mistake. 
Each part of the medication system was 
unreliable in some way. 
While considerable eff orts have been made 
to improve patient safety in the NHS since 
Mr Jowett’s death, we still have little quantifi able 
evidence about the reliability of healthcare 
systems generally, and on how this aff ects 
patient safety.
Th is is partly because it is diffi  cult to defi ne
ideal, fully reliable systems in all aspects of 
healthcare. For instance, the choice of a drug to 
treat a particular condition may well depend on 
many inter-related factors, such as the patient’s 
other medical conditions and treatment. 
In fact, some complex processes cannot be
completely standardised without potentially 
compromising patient safety but when this is 
the case, it is important to note any reason for 
deviating from the default procedure (for 
instance, an allergy to the usual choice of drug).
Th e Health Foundation commissioned this 
research to address these issues. We have 
looked at the extent, type and causes of failures 
in reliability in diff erent healthcare systems: 
failures which have the potential to create risk 
or cause patient harm. Our objectives were to:
–  identify and describe a selection of common 
but important processes within healthcare in 
which mistakes are commonly made.
–  explore the extent to which and the 
reasons why these mistakes are made, with 
comparisons between diff erent organisations.
–  identify the systems factors involved.
–  make recommendations for improving 
system reliability.
HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS?  11
Th e research was designed to run in parallel 
with phase 1 of the Health Foundation’s Safer 
Clinical Systems programme, which started 
in 2008 and runs until 2010. 
Th is is the fi rst UK study to examine the 
reliability of healthcare systems and the impact 
of poor reliability on patient care in a range 
of organisations. We examined fi ve important 
processes within healthcare:
–  providing information at the point of 
clinical decision making
– prescribing for hospital inpatients
– handover within acute medicine
– providing operating theatre equipment
–  providing equipment for the insertion 
of intravenous lines.
Our approach
Th e study employed a mixed methods approach, 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
For each of the topics, data collection took place 
in three stages during 2009. Th ese were:
– documenting the current processes 
–  measuring reliability using quantitative data 
collection methods specifi c to each topic
–  exploring the reasons for failures in reliability 
through interviews with key staff , using 
Vincent’s framework of factors that aff ect 
clinical practice.4
Th e clinical information needed 
for a typical surgical outpatient 
appointment to run properly was 
agreed to be:
–  past medical history
–  referral letter and any 
other specialty letter
–  discharge summary
– current medication
– allergies
–  radiology and imaging results
–  diagnostic test results
–  procedure notes and any 
anaesthetic record
– electrocardiogram report
– blood laboratory results
–  outpatient notes and/or the 
last clinic letter.
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Th e process
We measured the frequency with 
which information was missing 
in a selection of surgical outpatient 
clinics in three NHS organisations. 
Th ey used similar processes for 
fi nding medical records, starting 
two weeks before the relevant clinic. 
Each organisation used a mixture 
of electronic and paper systems 
for requesting and reporting test 
results, and used faxes to send 
paper copies of reports at short 
notice. We assessed a total of 1,161 
appointments.
Reliability
We found that overall, 15% of 
outpatient appointments were 
aff ected by missing clinical 
information (95% confi dence 
interval, 12.9%–17.1%) representing 
a reliability of 85%. In the worst 
cases, 1.5% of outpatients had their 
whole medical record missing (95% 
confi dence interval, 0.8%–2.2%). 
Of those patients with information 
missing, 32% experienced a 
disruption to their care (such as 
delays in treatment and cancelled 
operations) and in 20% of cases there 
was a perceived risk of harm in the 
opinion of the doctors involved. 
In over half of the cases of missing 
information, doctors relied on the 
patient for the information. On one 
in fi ve occasions, doctors made a 
clinical decision despite lacking 
information.
Variation between 
organisations
Th ere was signifi cant variation 
between organisations. Reliability 
in terms of having all the required 
information present ranged from 
73% to 96% between the three 
organisations. Organisation A had 
only one of 411 records missing (95% 
confi dence interval, 0–0.6%), which 
demonstrates that it is possible to 
have much more robust systems. 
Th e variations between diff erent 
clinics in the same organisation were 
not explored, as the type of clinic is 
not routinely recorded.
CLINICAL INFORMATION 
IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
Doctors are oft en faced with making decisions 
in the absence of important clinical information. 
Th is has been found to be a key contributing 
factor in medical error5. We studied this in 
surgical outpatients to fi nd out how oft en 
information is missing, why, and how the doctor 
proceeded, identifying any risks to patient safety 
and the impact on the patient’s care pathway. 
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Systems factors
Th e doctors we interviewed told us 
how this lack of information can 
cause serious problems: 
‘If you see the person without 
the letter… the patient’s perception 
of why they’re in the clinic may be 
diff erent to the reasons that the 
GP stated.’
We found over 60 reasons why 
information might not be available. 
Th e main organisational factor was 
the diffi  culty in organising a patient’s 
complex care pathway to ensure all 
tests results were ready at their next 
outpatient appointment.
Th ere were particular problems if 
there were two parallel systems, one 
paper and one electronic; staff  oft en 
did not know where they should 
look for test results.
In addition, while paper systems 
pose their own problems, computers 
require the need for a password, 
access to a terminal and the time to 
log in while an appointment is still 
going on. Temporary staff  were oft en 
not trained in computer systems or 
given passwords.
Conclusion
In 2008–09 there were approximately 
66m outpatient appointments in 
England, Scotland and Wales. If our 
fi ndings are typical that would suggest
that important clinical information 
is missing from nearly 10m of 
these and, as a result, patients at 2m 
appointments may be exposed to the 
risk of harm.
Full clinical information 
was not available at 
just under one in seven 
outpatient appointments.
PRESCRIBING FOR 
HOSPITAL INPATIENTS 
Prescribing errors have the potential for serious patient harm. 
A median error rate of 7% was reported in a recent systematic 
review of prescribing for inpatients.6 However, wide variation 
in methods and defi nitions means that it has been virtually 
impossible to compare the results of diff erent studies and until
now there have been no comparative studies in adult populations 
in more than one UK organisation. 
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Th e process
We studied prescribing errors in ten 
medical admissions and surgical 
wards in three NHS organisations. 
All used paper-based inpatient 
prescribing. Discharge prescribing 
was mainly electronic at organisation 
A and part electronic and part 
paper-based at organisations B 
and C.
Reliability
Errors in newly written regular, 
‘when required’ and discharge 
prescriptions were recorded by ward 
pharmacists using established 
methods and defi nitions.7, 8
Overall, 1,025 prescribing errors 
were identifi ed in 974 of 6,605 
medication orders (14.7%, 95% 
confi dence interval, 13.8 %–15.6%) 
in the three organisations. Th is 
represents a reliability of 85.3%. 
An average of 0.9 doses were given 
(including cases in which the 
medication was omitted completely) 
before each error was corrected 
(range 0–11). An estimated 19% 
of prescribing errors were predicted 
to have serious consequences to the 
patient if not corrected.
Types of error are summarised in 
Figure 1. Th e most common types in 
all three organisations were incorrect 
dosing, and omitting recommended 
medication entirely.
Variation between 
and inside hospitals
Th e overall incidence of errors was 
higher at organisation C at 18.4% 
(95% confi dence interval, 16.7%– 
20.1%) than at organisation A at 
13.6% (95% confi dence interval, 
12.3%–14.9%) and B at 12.2% (95% 
confi dence interval 10.7%–13.7%). 
On site B the higher prevalence of 
dosing errors was partly the result 
of prescribers failing to specify the 
maximum dose of ‘when required’ 
medication, as the drugs chart did 
not require them to state this. 
Th e error rate for the admissions 
wards was signifi cantly higher than 
that for the surgical wards, but this 
was accounted for by the higher 
incidence of prescribing for new 
patients (Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Types of prescribing error identifi ed at each organisation
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Figure 2: Incidence of diff erent categories of prescribing error by clinical specialty
Systems factors
We selected some typical prescribing 
errors, and explored their likely 
causes through interviews with 
prescribers, pharmacists and nurses. 
Th ere were a variety of systems factors:
–  Lack of feedback to doctors 
about their prescribing errors, 
as pharmacists either correct many 
of the more obvious errors without 
telling the doctor concerned, or 
consult a diff erent doctor because 
the prescriber’s shift  has fi nished.
–  Variation between doctors in how 
they prescribe certain drugs, such 
as those to be given once weekly 
or those to be stopped at a future 
date. 
–  Health records which have not 
been fully fi lled out with the details 
of prescribing decisions.
–  A focus on the choice of drug, 
not on doses and formulations.
–  Lack of information from 
primary care about patients’ 
medication histories. Junior 
doctors were reluctant to ask 
or challenge consultants about 
prescribing.
Our interviewees suggested a range 
of solutions:
–  Involving pharmacists at the 
point of prescribing rather than 
retrospectively.
–  Increasing the use of non-medical 
prescribers with independent 
prescribing qualifi cations.
–  Better communication between 
primary and secondary care, 
including a common electronic 
record for prescribed medication.
–  Increasing the focus on practical 
prescribing skills for doctors, both 
in medical school and in the fi rst 
few months of practice.
–  Increasing the use of electronic 
prescribing.
–  A designated quiet area for 
prescribing and/or revising drug 
charts to ensure that prescribers 
check for certain types of error.
–  Encouraging better feedback and 
learning from errors.
Around one in seven 
prescriptions contained 
an error. In one in fi ve 
cases this would have 
serious consequences 
if not corrected.
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Th e process
We studied doctors’ shift  handovers 
in two types of clinical area in three 
NHS organisations. We agreed a core 
data set of 13 items of information 
(such as the presenting condition 
and the diagnosis) which clinicians 
would expect to be handed over, 
and observed which of these items 
were in fact discussed in each patient 
handover. In this case we focused 
on standardisation, rather than 
reliability, since there is currently 
no defi nition of an ideal handover.
CLINICAL 
HANDOVER 
Clinical handover involves communication and 
coordination – recognised as important factors 
in the quality of care. Current handover processes 
are oft en not standardised and are highly variable. 
A recent literature review concluded that 
poor clinical handover could pose a high risk 
to patient safety.9 
HOW SAFE ARE CLINICAL SYSTEMS?  17
Conclusion
We identifi ed prescribing errors 
in 14.7% of all newly written 
medication orders screened by 
hospital pharmacists on the study 
wards, corresponding to a failure in 
reliability of 14.7%. Th e prevalence 
and types of prescribing error varied 
between organisations, but similar 
factors contributed to all.
Reliability
Data was collected for 246 patient 
handovers during 19 handover 
sessions across the three 
organisations (Figure 3). Th e items 
of information most commonly 
communicated were: patient name 
(77% of patients); presenting 
condition (77%) and diagnosis 
(75%). Th e items least frequently 
communicated were: which 
investigations had not yet been 
carried out (17%); investigations 
for which results had not yet come 
back (18%); ongoing treatment 
(17%) and complications (18%).
Variation between 
organisations
The handover in each organisation 
was conducted differently, and a 
direct comparison is therefore 
diffi cult. However, it is clear that 
although the organisations varied in 
the degree to which they handed 
over details of the patients’ identity, 
there was a distinct trend across all 
three organisations to communicate 
diagnostic items such as presenting 
condition and diagnosis more 
frequently than the items relating 
to care management (Figure 4). 
We did not explore additional 
variation within organisations, 
as only one clinical specialty was 
studied in each.
Systems factors
We found that the details of patient 
assessment were communicated 
more frequently than those of tests 
and future care. Th e interviews 
showed that clinicians focused on 
the immediate, not the longer-term. 
One interviewee told us: 
‘You’re dealing with clinicians and 
clinicians are not thinking about the 
end-to-end clinical journey of their 
patients. Th e clinicians are very 
focused on the presenting complaint 
and the diagnosis, and to a certain 
extent the treatment, but in terms of 
the other bits of the patient pathway 
such as complications, the discharge 
planning, even the communication 
with relatives, that isn’t the 
primary focus.’
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Figure 3:  Percentage of 246 patients for whom each information item was communicated at handover
Interviewees indicated system 
factors aff ecting the quality of 
clinical handover included:
–  Th e lack of a standard protocol 
for handover.
–  An atmosphere in which too many 
things are happening, including 
demands on clinicians, for a 
structured and formal handover.
–  Information which has not been 
updated, especially out of hours.
–  A reactive organisational culture 
in which handover is not seen to be 
a priority and there is no culture of 
questioning and challenging.
–  Th e lack of training for doctors 
in handover and other non-
technical skills.
Th ere were a number of 
recommendations for improving 
the quality of clinical handover:
–  A standardised handover 
format including an agreed time 
and place.
–  Streamlining shift  patterns for 
diff erent staff  groups, and insisting 
on bleep-free time during 
handover, so that this handover 
format can be put into practice.
–  Developing team-based handovers 
to improve communication.
–  Providing training in non-
technical skills.
–  Progressing towards a proactive, 
pathway-driven culture.
Conclusion
Th ere is a general consensus 
that the fi rst step towards making 
clinical handovers more reliable is 
standardisation.9, 10, 11 In addition, 
organisations may need to ensure 
that staff  have enough time to 
concentrate on following formal 
handover protocols.
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Figure 4: Comparison between organisations in terms of the percentage of patients 
for whom each item of the core data set was communicated at handover
Reliability
Th eatre staff  were asked to self-
report equipment problems, and 
this was then supplemented with 
observations by trained staff . Data 
was collected on 490 procedures. 
A total of 103 equipment problems 
were reported, aff ecting 19% of 
operations (95% confi dence interval, 
16%–23%) and representing 
a reliability of 81%. Types of 
equipment problems, and the ways 
they were dealt with, are summarised 
in Figures 5 and 6. Th e commonest 
problem was that equipment 
was simply not available (56% of 
equipment problems) followed by 
faulty equipment (38%). In 52% of 
cases, surgeons had to work around 
the problem. It was estimated that 
7% of problems led to severe delays 
in surgery and 3% to potential 
adverse events.
Variation between 
organisations
Th ere were signifi cant diff erences 
between organisations (Figure 5). 
Organisation D had the highest 
incidence of problems, aff ecting 37% 
of operations. At organisations A and 
F, 19% and 12% of operations were 
aff ected respectively. Delays were 
more likely to occur at organisation 
D. Th ere were also some diff erences 
in how equipment problems were 
dealt with (Figure 6). To simplify 
data collection, we did not record 
details of each operation and so 
did not study variation within 
organisations.
Th e process
We studied trauma, orthopaedic, 
general surgical and paediatric 
theatres in three NHS organisations. 
All had similar processes for 
ordering surgical equipment. Some 
equipment was stored locally, some 
was taken out on loan when needed, 
and some was obtained directly from 
the manufacturer. Th e sterilisation 
unit in organisation F was in-house 
while in organisations A and D, 
sterilisation was outsourced. 
OPERATING THEATRE 
EQUIPMENT
Equipment problems are common in operating theatres, yet few studies 
have described and evaluated their impact. We aimed to describe the type 
of equipment problems that clinicians encounter, the way these problems 
are dealt with, and the eff ect in terms of delays to surgery and risks to 
patient safety.
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Systems factors
Interviews with theatre staff  showed 
that many equipment problems were 
associated with communication and 
team processes. 
Equipment problems in theatre 
were considered the norm by our 
interviewees:
‘If you ask staff , any of the staff , 
they’ll say exactly the same…
I’d say in relation to missing 
instrumentation, every set now has 
probably got something missing.’
Interviewees highlighted 
organisational factors, such as 
storage space, management and 
sterilisation.
Interviewees also felt that the people 
preparing the equipment did not 
understand what was needed for 
surgical processes highlighted, such 
as storage space, management and 
sterilisation processes:
‘All our equipment is sterilised outside 
the hospital and I think since that has 
happened… there have been lots of 
issues… obviously the people who are 
wrapping [the equipment] don’t really 
have the knowledge or don’t really 
know exactly what’s going in the tray.’
Another health professional 
commented:
‘Th e people who work in the sterilisation 
unit have no understanding of what we 
require. Th ey are there to do a certain 
job of making sure that it’s sterile for us 
and that the tray is like it should be, but 
they have no interrelation of what the 
surgical need is.’
In addition, locum and fl oating 
theatre staff  may not be familiar with 
the particular theatre where they are 
working, so that they may not know 
where to fi nd the equipment they 
need. Finally, equipment was not 
always stored in its designated place.
Recommendations for resolving 
equipment problems include:
–  Improving communication 
between theatre staff  and sterile 
services and between surgeons 
and nurses before surgery.
–  Th eatre checklists and briefi ngs 
to improve communication.
–  Regular safety checks to pick up 
unperformed tasks.
–  Developing a sense of ownership 
and responsibility among theatre 
teams, rather an accepting these 
problems as inevitable.
–  Improving processes for 
making it clear which equipment 
is necessary.
–  Improving the processes for 
requisitioning and storing 
equipment.
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Figure 5: Types of equipment problems encountered in each organisation. ‘Wrong use’ 
refers to equipment being used incorrectly or for another purpose to that intended.  
Conclusion
Equipment problems were 
common, occurring in 19% of 
operations. Oft en surgeons have 
to work around these problems, 
sometimes compromising patient 
safety and causing disruption. 
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Figure 6: How the problems were dealt with in each organisation. 
In nearly one in fi ve 
operations, the equipment 
was faulty, missing or 
used incorrectly – or staff  
did not know where it 
was or how to use it.
Th e process
Processes varied between 
organisations. Organisation A had 
pre-prepared cannulation packs 
including the cannula, organisation 
F stored items independently and 
organisation D had packs excluding 
the cannula. Th e organisations 
restocked in a similar manner.
Reliability
We assessed availability of the 
following required items using a 
reporting form completed by the 
person undertaking the cannulation:
–  hand hygiene facilities
–  gloves for the person inserting 
the cannula
–  skin preparation equipment
–  clean tourniquet
–  intravenous cannula of 
appropriate size
–  specifi c intravenous cannula 
dressing
–  sharps disposal bin.
We studied a total of 350 
peripheral cannulations and found 
47 problems, covering 46 (13%) 
cases. Th is represents a reliability 
of 87%. Most cases of failure were 
the result of one missing piece of 
equipment. Figure 7 summarises 
the types of failure. In over half the 
cases, staff  worked around the 
problem (for instance, by using 
alternative equipment) and in 30% 
they obtained stock from another 
area. In 23% of cases the problem 
was considered to have some impact 
on patient safety.
SYSTEMS FOR INSERTING
INTRAVENOUS LINES 
A high proportion of patients admitted to hospital require an intravenous 
line to be inserted. Th is serves an important purpose but the process is also 
associated with potential risks to the patient (infection) and staff  (needlestick 
injury).Th e infections associated with intravenous catheters are in turn 
associated with signifi cant morbidity and mortality, with bacteraemia rates 
of 0.3 per 1,000 cannulae. In an attempt to improve this situation, standardised 
systems known as ‘care bundles’ have been introduced to promote best 
practice. We studied the availability of the items required by the national 
care bundle for inserting peripheral cannulae.
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Variation between 
organisations
Reliability rates were similar 
between organisations: 80% at 
organisation A; 89% at organisations 
D and F. However, the specifi c 
equipment involved varied between 
organisations. In one organisation 
80% of the failures were the result of 
a missing sharps bin (or the available 
sharps bin was full). In another 53% 
related to missing tourniquets; and 
at the third 43% involved missing 
skin cleanser. In the organisation 
where cannulation packs included 
cannulae, these were sometimes the 
wrong size for the clinical situation. 
Th e sample size was not big enough 
to allow us to examine the variability 
within organisations.
Systems factors
Interviews revealed a variety of 
causes. Th e work environment – 
including problems with storage 
and supply, and problems with 
communicating about stock levels –
was a major factor. Equipment was 
less likely to be available out of 
hours. Th e supply of sharps bins 
was a particular issue.
Recommendations included:
–  Addressing the availability and 
design of appropriate sharps bins.
–  Making sharps bins readily 
available at the point of care.
–  Ensuring that there are systems 
to replace full sharps bins.
–  Designing cannulation packs 
which address the need for extra 
and/or diff erent cannulae.
Conclusion
Equipment for inserting intravenous 
cannulae was not available in 13% 
of cases, representing an overall 
reliability rate of 87%. Th e reasons 
for missing equipment appear 
to vary between the diff erent sites. 
Interviews suggest that stock control 
oft en depends on individuals 
maintaining the system, rather than 
on a self-regulating system which 
ensures that equipment is 
adequately available.
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Figure 7: Type of equipment problem encountered by staff .
n=total number of failures at each site 
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Conclusions
This is the fi rst study to analyse reliability in 
healthcare in this manner. With the exception 
of prescribing error, there were no previous 
studies of the reliability of these systems, 
and no studies of more than one organisation 
using the same methods. 
We found signifi cant variation between 
organisations for each topic. Problems such 
as faulty or missing equipment affected 37% 
of operations at organisation D but only 12% 
at organisation F. This variation, and the fact 
that some organisations have created more 
reliable systems, suggests that it is possible for 
all organisations to create systems that have 
higher reliability. 
We have highlighted some of the underlying 
causes for failures in reliability. There were 
many common contributing factors:
–  A lack of feedback mechanisms, both for 
individuals (for example, to doctors about 
prescribing errors) and systems (for example, 
stock control for cannulation equipment).
–  Lack of standardisation (for example in how 
certain drugs are prescribed, how doctors’ 
handovers are conducted, and how equipment 
is stored in theatres).
–  Poor communication, both written (for 
example, poor documentation of medication 
changes in patients’ health records) and verbal 
(for example, interrupted handovers).
–  Overly complex processes (for example 
systems for obtaining health records and 
off-site equipment preparation).
–  Staff acceptance of poor reliability, which 
has often built up over time so that they 
now accept this as normal and do not report 
problems (for instance, accepting handovers 
of varying standards).
–  A lack of ownership of issues (so that, for 
example, staff blame other people for the 
lack of operating equipment).
Staff often found solutions by working 
around the problem, for example by obtaining 
information from patients rather than their 
health records, or using disposable gloves as 
tourniquets. In some cases, this meant they took 
risks, for example by making clinical decisions 
without information, or transferring used 
sharps to sharps bins in remote locations.
The contributing factors suggest that a systems 
focus is required to improve the reliability 
of healthcare processes and patient safety. 
The higher levels of reliability identifi ed in 
some organisations suggest that it is possible 
to create more reliable systems, but even these 
can be improved upon.
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Th is report summarises the results of research into the reliability 
of fi ve common healthcare systems, examined across seven NHS 
organisations. Th e fi ndings show that the reliability of systems 
has rarely been considered in the healthcare setting and that the 
variations in reliability identifi ed here increase risk for patients.
Th e report is relevant for all those working to improve patient 
safety, from the front line of clinical services to the board room.  
In particular, senior clinicians and managers will fi nd it useful 
in highlighting the organisational factors that need to be considered 
in order to improve system reliability. A full research report is 
also available. 
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